To define terrorism, we have to redefine the state — Ben Lefkowitz

By: Ben Lefkowitz

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In her article “Can Terrorism be Defined?” scholar Lisa Stampnitzky recalls a Department of Defense symposium in the mid-1980s where there were “almost as many definitions [of terrorism] as there were speakers.” Her recollection reveals a long-standing tension between how the international community recognizes terrorism and state sovereignty.

 

Facing a rise in non-state actor armed conflict, each government has come up with their own definition of what constitutes terrorism. Even states with strong alliances, such as the United States, England and Turkey, all have different definitions of terrorism. For example, these states classify Kurdish non-state actors differently. So why is there no internationally recognized definition of terrorism? The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, arguably the most important document in defining modern state sovereignty and diplomatic relations, may be at the heart of the issue. By giving states the coveted monopoly on violence within their borders, this 1648 treaty established that existing states have a fundamental right to defend their borders and system of government.

 

Today, Westphalian state sovereignty is not only codified in every existing state, but also is seen as the end goal for many non-state actors such as rebel groups, self-indigenous movements, and even internationally recognized terrorist organizations. Yet with no room on Earth for new states, any non-state actor seeking independence will naturally be impeding on another state’s sovereignty and right to exist. This inherent intrusiveness becomes particularly tricky when indigenous groups seek self-determination, a right that in the last century has been promoted through international law and the UN Charter. But because our modern definition of a state leaves no room for new ones, practically every independence movement has included some form of violence; and that violence is often classified as terrorism. 

 

The Kurdish independence movement is an example of the tension between the quest for self-determination and defending state sovereignty, as the movement is classified differently throughout the international community. While Kurdish rebel groups such as the Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) or the Peoples Protection Units (YPG) are seen as critical US allies in fighting ISIS, Turkey (a member of the US-led NATO alliance) sees their movement as a threat to Turkish sovereignty. Turkish President Erdogan has gone as far as launching attacks on the SDF controlled areas in Syria following withdrawal of American troops from the region, putting SDF allies—such as the US and other Western nations—in uncomfortable positions.

 

Additionally, Erdogan attempted to use diplomatic means to threaten Western support for Kurdish groups by calling on NATO to classify the YPG as a terrorist organization. Erdogan’s argument for this classification stems from his belief that both the YPG and SDF are offshoots of an already classified terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The US and France openly oppose this claim. Despite Western claims that the YPG and PKK are separate organizations, there is mounting evidence that the two have worked closely, if not directly cooperated, in the past. Despite this evidence, the YPG and SDF remain heavily backed by the US while the PKK remains classified as a terrorist organization. While the dispute between Western nations and Turkey over the Kurdish movement have not initiated any wars, or permanently destroyed any relationships, it has put a serious strain on the once impenetrable NATO alliance.

 

The Kurdish example can be traced back the lack of a universal definition of terrorism. Within America’s decision to support the SDF yet label the PKK as a terrorist organization, it appears as though the word “terrorism” is being used as a political tool to protect its allegiance with Turkey rather than maintain a concrete and uniform definition.

 

The failure to create a universal and concrete definition of terrorism returns to Westphalian national sovereignty. For centuries, the international community has prioritized existing state sovereignty over all non-state actors. These priorities have resulted in the failure of colonial powers to give land to indigenous peoples, a proliferation of violence in civil wars, and even the failure to establish a singular definition of terrorism. Rather, the term “terrorism” has been regularly exaggerated and loosened by states for geo-political convivence and political gain.

 

Stampnitzky’s recollection only goes to prove that scholars and states alike are unable to concretely define terrorism. Unless national sovereignty is redefined in a way that allows for states to uniformly define and implement the term “terrorism,” politicians and scholars must stop advocating for policy as if their definition is true. Because if they do not, as seen in the Kurdish independence movement, lives will be endangered.

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